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NONE who has read Thurman Arnold's The Folklore of Capitalism will understand that no disparagement is intended in
characterizing it as the politician's handbook. It is not a handbook of specific practices but of general ideas and principles. Whoever
has a firm grasp of them and is capable of sober analysis of concrete situations can write his own shrewd recipes. These ideas and principles are
fascinatingly illustrated with a wealth of data. But insight into their relevance and validity depends upon an appreciation of the author's basic
attitude or point of view.
The point of view which we are attempting to sketch here is one which allows a
place to the folklore necessary for social organization, which does not mislead us with
respect to its function in society. It is the point of view of modern psychiatry without
its classifications. This attitude has not attained the dignity of a formulated philosophy. It is one which the realistic politician has taken all along. The task of the
philosopher is to make it respectable so that respectable people can use it [p. 1421.

It is a book, then, about politicians for those who want to be politicians
or to understand them, by one whose politics includes, among other things,
a desire that respectable people become politicians. Let us note in passing
that the author regards it as peculiarly important that respectable people
(however they are defined) should become realistic politicians. Later on
we shall examine the basic assumption in the light of which this preference
becomes intelligible.
Insofar as it is a book about politicians and their ways, Arnold's The
Folklore of Capitalismis a little masterpiece of insight, expository skill and
suggestiveness. For him politics is as broad as social life. He demonstrates that if we take political behavior as the subject matter of our
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inquiry, little of our customary academic political theory touches it at
any point. Where it does play a role, it merges into popular social theory
which is little more than a kind of "ceremonial literature that reconciles
conflicts by concealing them." Organizations are the dranatispersonae of
conflicts. To be effective, organizations must say one thing and do another. Those who judge organizations by what they say are confusing
incantation with rational analysis. Those who would do the business
which organizations must do, without these incantations, will find that
their organizations will melt away. For it is "tears and parades .... which
are the moving forces of the world in which we happen to live." Whoever
understands that will understand both why it is necessary to have a folklore, a set of myths, ideologies, and isms, and why this folklore must be
irrational. "For the purpose of binding organizations together nothing
makes as much sense as nonsense, and hence nonsense always wins."
Here, too, we must stick a pin to which we shall return. Nonsense, by
definition, always wins. Why then, one kind of nonsense rather than another, the nonsense of the New Deal rather than the nonsense of rugged
individualism? In places the author suggests that the victory of one organization and its hallowed nonsensp over another depends upon some
standard or ideal by whose light individuals judge the fruits of public tubthumping and sub rosa practices. But it is dear that on the author's own
view all standards and ideals are nonsense-high and profound nonsense
to be sure-but nonsense all the same.
On the descriptive level of political behavior, creedal and practical,
Arnold's book is a noteworthy achievement. Particularly for America
whose intellectual life has been comparatively unaffected by the writings
of Pareto, Michels, and the Marxian critique of ideology. Even if he has
rediscovered truths that were already known, to have rediscovered them
in the context he did-American folkways in economics, law and politics-is a genuine contribution to realistic stocktaking. No summary can
communicate the freshness and incisiveness with which the illustrative
material is handled. For example, I know of no clearer presentation of the
discrepancy between institutional myth and practice than is revealed in
Arnold's analysis of the mechanism of control in bankruptcies, in holding
companies, and in taxation policies. We laugh when we read DeMan's
account of the Constantinople date vendor who did a brisk trale to the
cry of: "Hassan's dates are larger than they are! Hassan's dates are larger than they are!" But few are aware of the extent to which the American
public reacts to generically similar slogans, symbols and "fundamental
principles" in political life. Whatever the science of politics is, it must
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recognize how easy it is for people to live by inconsistencies; and it is
obvious that those for whom politics is an art must make knowing use of
this.
The limitations of Arnold's book begin to emerge just as soon as we
leave the level of bare description. The author has two uncoordinated
theories of why social philosophies which have no significance nonetheless
have effects. At times he writes as if allegiance to ideologies arises out of
an original tropismatic reaction to words. People go counter to their own
selfish interests and that of the community "out of pure mystical idealism" (p. 5o). Indeed, Arnold does not hesitate to attribute the most overt
forms of struggle to excessive metaphysical enthusiasm, thereby suggesting another causal explanation for the World War. "Most of the interesting and picturesque wars have been fought not over practical interests but over pure metaphysics" (p. 9o). At other times he admits that
social philosophies have no significance at all "except with reference to the
conflicts out of which they arise." But what are the basic conflicts out of
which social philosophies arise? Arnold does not so much as state an hypothesis concerning them.
His failure to do so has a peculiar effect upon his own intellectual procedure. Most of his book, and decidedly the best part of it, consists in
exposing the inspirational and non-descriptive character of the bulk of
old-style capitalistic folklore, which is popularly called "hokum." But his
strictures are very severe against the Utopians and rationalists and
academic purists who think that a society can solve its bread and butter
problem without hokum. Vital lies and illusions, he asserts, are even more
necessary to sustain organizations than they are to sustain men. And in
his criticisms, Arnold concentrates exclusively upon the hokum of the old
style (Hooverian) folklore leaving untouched the hokum of the new style
(Rooseveltian) folklore or, more accurately, mythology, since it has not
yet been institutionalized. His contempt for liberals and radicals who are
critical of both kinds of folklore is none the less apparent despite its
restraint. In the absence of a theory concerning the interests which motivate ideologies, Arnold has no answer to the simple questions: Well then,
what's all the verbal shooting about? On the basis of what data can you
predict that one myth or another will be accepted? What set of considerations determines the type of ideology an organization will embrace?
The consequences of the failure to relate interests to social ideals lead
to an ambiguous account of the nature of creeds and mythologies. We
read that "institutional creeds, such as law, economics or theology, must
be false in order to function effectively" (p. 357). Yet we are also told that
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ritualistic beliefs sooner or later affect behavior, that institutions like
personalities "become very much like the little pictures which men have
of them" (p. 334). Mr. Arnold is not clear in his own mind (i) whether or
not social doctrines are strictly meaningless, incapable of being confirmed
or invalidated by relevant evidence, or (ii) whether they are all demonstrably false, or finally (iii) whether some are true and some are false. If
he holds to the first, he must regard them as expressive statements. To
differentiate them properly for scientific purposes, he must analyze the
interests they express and translate them into specific programs of action
as preparatory to intelligent evaluation. This he rarely does. If he holds
to the second, then he must recognize that we are already in possession of
a sufficient store of true information about the social process-sufficient to
enable us to declare ideologies to be false-which justifies the hope that
some scientifically valid social doctrines may be developed. Yet if I understand Mr. Arnold aright all social science is part of folklore. If he holds
to the third, he owes the reader an account of the methods by which he
determines the truth or falsity of social doctrines.
As a book about politicians, then, Mr. Arnold's discussion suffers from
the failure to present some hypothesis which will account for the varieties
of political verbal behavior which his own descriptive survey has uncovered. But as Mr. Arnold makes abundantly plain, his book is written
for those who would be successful politicians (statesmen, publicists, professional revolutionists, etc.) and it must be considered from this point of
view, too. In fact, it is a safe bet that Arnold's views here will have a practical impact upon American political life-right, center and left. The nub
of Arnold's advice, based upon his study of the ways of man as a political
animal, is this: fundamental loyalties must be given not to principles but
to organizations (p. 384). Creeds and doctrines are the invisible but potent agglutinative forces of organizational solidarity and effectiveness.
They must be judged only in relation to the techniques of political control.
He addresses himself particularly to "respectable people with humanitarian motives" and tells them, almost in so many words, -'instead of cussing
out the politicians, imitate them.' Organizational myths must not be
criticized, or weakened by logical analysis; nor, if practical results are
desired, are they to be believed in. The populace loves large talk and
circus play: it cannot be kept content with a mere diet of bread and
cheese. Again Arnold's argument takes an ambiguous form. When he appeals to "respectable people with humanitarian motives" to take politics
away from the "selfish" (p. 37) professional politician, the implied assumption is that the organization is to serve the community interest, what-
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ever that may be. When he describes and defends the life career of the
effective organization, he shows that its primary concern is to further the
organizationalinterest and to take note of and appease conflicting interests only to the point where organizational security demands it. This curious reluctance to explore the relationship between concrete interests and
organizational structure makes it possible for Arnold to insinuate that the
respectable politician represents the interest of everybody.
It is in conjunction with this theme that Arnold realizes he is skating
on very dangerous ground. After all, the most successful political organizations of our time are those headed by Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin.
They have developed the most elaborate forms of hokum and have won
complete freedom to carry out organizational policies. We must not be
too superior to learn from them. Yet at the same time Arnold is obviously
bothered by the fear that critics will point to these totalitarian regimes as
constituting the reductio ad absurdum and, if I may be permitted the
phrase, the reductio ad nauseam of his position. He is, therefore, compelled to be 'choosy' in evaluating their accomplishments. On other occasions, however, he is impatient with unrealistic philosophers who, starting from certain principles, try to separate the good from the bad in situations where they mutually involve each other. He writes:
The strength of Hitler lay in the fact that he put everyone to work and managed to
develop national pride. His weakness lay in his persecutions. Such persecutions are
not, I believe, necessary to the exercise of national power or the development of rational morale. The reason why they are apt to occur in times of change is that respectable people in such times are too devoted to principles to solve immediate prob-.
lems or to build up morale by the objective use of ceremony [pp. 41-42].

It has been said that when a great mind commits a blunder, it does not
content itself with an ordinary one. And when a hard-boiled realist goes
soft, we get an uncommon variety of naive mush. How does Mr. Arnold
know that the persecutions were not necessary to put everyone to work
and to develop national pride? To put everyone to work in Germany
meant the establishment of labor and concentration camps and the abolition of the right to strike. Is this possible without persecution? To build
up morale by the objective use of ceremony meant the suppression of all
those who argued that the racial myth and the legend that Germany had
been stabbed in the back by the liberals and socialists was not justified by
the evidence. What method does Arnold know of keeping critics of fraud
and nonsense silent different from those employed by Hitler? And to put
the responsibility for persecution upon those who are too devoted to principle is tantamount to blaming them for not doing what Hitler did before
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Hitler did it. From a narrow organizational point of view, and only from
that point of view, the criticism is just. If an organization is to survive,
it must beat the other organizations to the gun. But from the same point
of view, it is the sickliest sentimentalism to bewail or question the necessity of the means employed to achieve the end. Insofar as Arnold touches
the means-ends problem, his thinking is in the pre-reflective pupa stage.
Even more grotesquely naive is his treatment of Stalin's regime. He
quotes a piece of apologetic writing by Walter Duranty according to
which Stalin is "making men out of mice" (including the mice who made
the revolution of 1917) by encouraging games, publicity stunts, and
celebrations of the power of the Communist Party. This is good as far as
it goes. As Duranty says it makes the Russians "men, not mice or slaves."
The pity of it on Arnold's view, is that Stalin spoiled matters by "abandoning this technique for a great purge." What Arnold does not see is
that Stalin has not abandoned this technique but accompanied it by a
purge, that one reinforces the other, and that with greater or lesser intensity, Stalin's regime, like all minority dictatorships, has been one continuous purge. And whom has he purged? The critical, the courageous
and independent-the mice that were already men.
There is a reason for this glaring blind spot in Arnold's normally acute
political perception. It is to be found in a revealing analogy which runs
through this book as well as his Symbols of Government. The ideal politician is cast in the role of a trained psychiatrist. His function as head of the
state organization is to make the patients (citizens) comfortable and "as
little of a nuisance" to themselves as possible. They can even be permitted
their rantings (ideologies). The latter have only diagnostic value. They
indicate the types of insanity by which the patients are afflicted. No
psychiatrist who knows his profession would dream of refuting them as
part of his curative technique. The world may be regarded as one vast
madhouse whose needs are ministered to by trained psychiatrists in the
guise of patient politicians. This interesting analogy explains why Arnold
is so indifferent to the kinds of ideologies which flourish in the political
world and lumps them indiscriminately together. That is why he resents
normative judgments as meddling intrusion by preachers and moralists
who really constitute just another class of patients. That is why the methods of Hitler and Stalin seem to him unnecessarily crude.
Now there may be some justification for Arnold's lack of first hand
knowledge about Germany and Russia, particularly if he relies upon
journalists who write like government officials. But his unfamiliarity with
the procedures of insane asylums is difficult to explain for one who thinks
in psychiatrical metaphors. The regime which provides material comfort
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and freedom from the most luxuriant fantasy can only operate if it has at
its disposal padded-cells, straitjackets, and, in extreme emergencies, the
black bottle. On Arnold's own analogy, there is no more sense in approving what Hitler and Stalin have done and disapprovinghow they did it than
in praising the cures asylums effect and, in the present stage of knowledge,
condemning their methods.
That Mr. Arnold appreciates, despite his flirtation with the metaphors
of psychiatry, the danger of making a fetish of organization as such, is
clearly expressed in the purpose of his book. We will recall that the author's declared objective indicates it is a book by one whose politics includes the desire that respectable people become politicians. It is in developing the implications of this objective that Arnold's actual, even if
unformulated, theory of social causation appears. And in developing the
implications of Arnold's theory of social causation, we shall make the
startling discovery that he is committed to a point of view which, on his
own analysis of the nature of folklore, is mythology.
Loyalty to organization rather than loyalty to principle is the first
lesson which Arnold would have the realist in politics learn. Once this is
granted the author makes no pretense that organizations by themselves
are sufficient for good government. He is aware that a political machine
can become corrupt and tyrannical. Its mythology may have such cohesive force that the corruptions and tyrannies may not even be risky for its
own survival. How, then, safeguard against them? Arnold's answer expresses the only theory of social causation to which he clings consistently-and unconsciously-in his book. Our safeguard is the character of the
men, the personality of the leaders, who dominate organizations. In discussing the rise of new organizations, he writes:
All he [the observer] needs to worry about is the character of the people who are
gradually coming into power. Does he think they are good organizers and at the
same time tolerant and humanitarian? [p. 342.]
If he does, there is no reason to worry about programs, principles and
institutional abuses. He has just got through showing that good organizers cannot be tolerant and that their humanitarianism extends only to
those who are acquiescent and tractable, but we pass this minor inconsistency by. The significant thing here is the decisive role which Arnold
assigns to the individual, to the good man in government. And not only
in government! Even in economics different types of men will give rise to
different types of mercantile organization. Specifically, the reason why
the "ten-cent store chains" have contributed so tremendously in reducing
the cost of living whereas the "grocery chains" have conspicuously failed
is attributed to the different types of men who have come to the top in
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these organizations (p. 351). Naturally, there is the inevitable reference
to Henry Ford. The author feels that if Henry Ford had gone into the
grocery business (perhaps any business), "he would have accomplished
the same kind of results as he did in the automobile business."
I am not interested in criticizing the author's theory at this point. My
concern is to show that he holds it. It makes intelligible his purposes, his
criticism of existing politicians whose techniques he approves, and his
explicit identification of organizationalstructurewith personality structure
(passim).
We now rapidly approach the denouement of the author's argument.
Organization is the instrument of political action. Men determine the
quality of organization. Therefore we need good men-the respectable, the
humanitarian, the sensitive-in order to have good government and good
society. These men will presumably still remain good even though they
employ the techniques of politicians from Machiavelli to Stalin. But this
is not the main point. The main point is that Arnold is committed to
ethical judgments-ethical judgments, which he began by declaring to
be the bane of intelligent political analysis, to be part of the meaningless
mythology of principle. There is no place for a theory of the good in
Arnold's analysis but its upshot makes the existence of the good man
central. How the good man is to be distinguished from the bad, what
schedule of ends and theory of means characterize his thinking and action,
what kind of organization he wishes to build, what specific program of
institutional reform he must espouse here and now-all these remain unillumined. Failing to realize that politics is a branch of ethics, the author
is forced into a left handed acknowledgment of the central place of ethical
judgment in his own analysis. Unaware of the implications of his own
analysis, he does not feel called upon to develop a theory of the good or
even to qualify his original position according to which ethical judgments,
strictly speaking, are nonsense statements. His brilliant treatment of illustrative material suggests a plausible theory of the good as intelligently
evaluated interest, but he passes it by.
Surprising as it may seem, once the author abandons the purely descriptive level his thought is astonishingly naive. His methodology is naive. His theory of social causation is naive. His unexamined commonsense ethical assumptions are naive. And in places where he is aware of a
difficulty but not of a solution his logic is naive.
This combination of realism concerning techniques and naivet6 about
principles is nothing new in the history of social thought. It is generally
allied to a social interest. In our own day the social interest which gives
a philosophy such as Arnold's driving force is the vocational need of the

THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM
intellectual worker and professional who make a career in public service
or the business of government,-a group which regards itself as independent of other classes, in fact as a special class whose function is to
mediate between others. It constitutes the permanent staff of officials who
observe with amused cynicism or resentful irritation that the more things
change (in ideology) the more they remain the same (in practice). In
periods of relative stability, it is content to identify its interests with
those of the dominant group in the economy. In effect, as Arnold himself
observes, that is the function of all government, in ordinary times, despite
its mythology of universalism. In periods of transition, however, where
social tension becomes so great that it threatens the prestige and security
of the dominant group in the economy, and with it the tenure, power and
privileged routines of the masterful servants who always imagine that
they rule behind the scenes, a dissociation of interests takes place. If the
dominant group adopts an intransigence which bids fair to carry the public servants (bureaucrats or political engineers or technicians-you may
take your choice) down to a common ruin, the latter look around for a
"leader" who can save what can be saved. In the last resort this means a
kind of Bonapartism. But if the leader can serve as the symbol of the
vague aspirations of the dissatisfied multitude, as a symbol of distrust
of the old myths and acceptance of the new, he can more easily do the
practical things which must be done to save the existing economy. Roosevelt is Arnold's leader. Although the theme and implications of his book
involve enduring problems, its present impact must be considered in the
light of the present clashes of interest in America. But this is a large subject and these pages are not the place for it.
THE FOLKLORE OF MR. HOOK-A REPLY
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Editors have requested a comment on Sidney Hook's review
of my book, The Folklore of Capitalism. I comply because perhaps a brief statement of my position will serve to clarify the
differences between our respective points of view. At the outset, I wish
to say that Mr. Hook's very generous praise of parts of the book is particularly gratifying since it comes from a scholar for whom I have the
greatest admiration and respect.
If I were to describe the differences in our attitudes, I would say that
Mr. Hook is an inspirational philosopher attempting to discover and
analyze ethical formulas while I am an unphilosophical observer attempt* Professor of Law, Yale University School.

